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This essay explores claims made frequently by artists, critics, and phi-
losophers that artworks bear personifying traits.  Rejecting the notion 
that artists possess the Pygmalion-like power to bring works of art to 
life, the article looks seriously at how parallels may exist between the 
ontological structures of the artwork and human personhood.  The dis-
cussion focuses on Arthur Danto’s claim that the “artworld” itself mani-
fests properties that are an imprint of the historical representation of the 
“world.” These “world” representations are implicitly embodied in the 
artist’s style. The “world” that is stamped on the people of a historical 
period entails a point of view that infl uences how they might act, some-
thing like the logic that guides a conversation. This “conversational” 
logic is also extant in the artworks that artists of a given period create. 
This analysis of Danto’s account of how people are connected to their 
world clarifi es Danto’s assertions that a parallel structure of personifi ca-
tion in the artwork and the human exists. It also explains his claims that 
artworks themselves appear to be in a kind of dialogue.
Keywords: Arthur Danto, personifi cation of art, artistic dialogue, 
artistic agency.
In this essay, I discuss Danto’s account of the human person and how 
it is essential to understanding the notion of embodied meaning he em-
ploys in his defi nition of the artwork. The essay begins with the ques-
tion of what Danto means when he suggests that artworks have some 
sort of personifi cation. Brian Soucek raises the question in his essay 
“Personifying art,” which examines the question of personifi cation in 
art, juxtaposing the positions of those who are sympathetic to those 
who are not. He suggests that by examining who we are as humans 
such that we personify art, we fi nd a third way to look at the dilemma. 
This essay follows Soucek’s lead but goes beyond the solution he points 
to, focusing on what Danto wrote on the human person and its relation 
to art. Scattered throughout what can seem to be obscure offhand com-
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ments, Danto’s account of the person is not fully articulated. Nonethe-
less, Danto’s references to the human as a being in a “sentential state”1 
and the account of ens representans he gives in The Body/Body Prob-
lem and Connections to the World together provide a consistent account 
of the person. My conclusion is that in Danto’s view, it is not the person 
that bestows a kind of personifi cation on the artwork. Rather, the on-
tological structure he refers to as our world,2 which gives us a point of 
view, is also at play in the creation of the artwork. Through “transitiv-
ity,” the activity of the artist imparts perspective, as “an ontological 
category,” to the artwork, thereby giving it some of the same properties 
of personhood that we as humans also possess.
Discussing the essays he wrote in The Body/Body Problem, Danto 
notes “how frequently I drew upon analogies between human beings 
and artworks, preeminently paintings and photographs, to clarify is-
sues in the metaphysics of embodiment and of truth” (Danto 1999a: 
ix). Indeed, the metaphoric references made throughout his work are 
too frequent to mention here. The intensional relationship of the meta-
phoric reference of artworks to people brings to light a parallel in the 
common way that humans are related to art and to other persons. 
“There is something like a parallel between what one might call the 
metaphysics of persons and the metaphysics of artworks” (Danto 2012: 
294). Soucek (2008) notes Danto’s use of the analogy of the personifi -
cation of art when discussing forgeries. In “Moving pictures,” Danto 
asks if it would matter if a recently widowed woman, whose husband 
had died unexpectedly, were promised a clone of her husband, an exact 
replacement, in, let’s suppose, three weeks. Should she love the clone 
as the original? Danto argues that it would matter, and the relation-
ship of the artwork to a mere object and the artwork to the forgery are 
parallel. Something like the soul of the work would be missing (Danto 
1999b: 212–214). “An artwork is then a physical object with whatever 
in the philosophy of art corresponds to the soul in the philosophy of the 
person” (Danto 2012: 294).
In his essay, Soucek (2008) examines two positions, one, like Dan-
to’s, attributing something to the artwork that is also in the person, 
and the other, representing those who argue that though personifi ca-
tion is understandable, any attribution of “sentience, or self-refl ection, 
or agency” to the artwork is something akin to a category mistake, and 
1 “Let me recklessly speak now of men as being in certain sentential states….I 
shall think of sentential states as internal to men …in predicating ‘believes-that-s’ 
of [a man], we are asserting that [a man] is in a sentential state” (Danto 1968: 89). 
What “we essentially are is a certain representation of the world: a person in a deep 
sense is the way he represents the world” (Danto 1973: 22 n26 on 201).
2 Danto does not necessarily use world in the same manner across all of his texts. 
Here, I will italicize world when it means a representation of the actual world. I will 
refer to the actual world as the world. Italicized, world will be a representation of 
world. A world representation, as I use it, will also refer to the representation of the 
(actual) world.
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hence false (230). Ultimately, Soucek rejects both positions, opting for 
a third path that examines what kind of persons we are such that we 
personify art. He concludes that “personifi cation of art is not ultimately 
about art at all. It is rather about us—about persons” (238). Soucek 
poses a challenge to Danto’s notion of personhood in art, raising the 
question as to where art’s power—to speak to us, to transform us, even 
to evoke change in us—comes from, suggesting we look inward, not to 
art itself. This approach addresses the problem of how or whether art 
can be ‘transformed’ by the artist. If we were to use Hume’s law, which 
we might formulate as ‘there is nothing in the conclusion that is not in 
the premise’, it is hard to see how something could be added to the art-
work which was not transferred from the artist, and if that is the case, 
do we have the Pygmalion-like power to produce a thing that entails 
personifying attributes through artistic means? Kant’s response to 
Hume’s laws was to recognize the active role the human mind plays in 
constructing the world we experience. In many senses, I’m very sympa-
thetic to this approach. But this is not how Danto formulates the rela-
tion of the person to the artwork; also, he does not look to the inner self 
as the source of art’s ‘personifi cation’. Thus, to dismiss his approach as 
a category error would be a mistake.
To defend Danto’s notion that a parallel between “the metaphysics 
of persons and the metaphysics of artworks” exists, I bring attention to 
the following facets of Danto’s philosophy: (a) Humans are representa-
tional beings, and the representations of our world that we receive are 
historically situated; (b) Danto sees little difference between inner and 
outer consciousness, except that individuals do not have the advantage 
of privileged access to their own inner states (since one can discern 
them about as well from an external perspective); (c) the representa-
tions that are our essence are, in some cases, akin to texts, vehicles 
of understanding, and can be embodied in mediums besides the fl esh; 
(d) the mind may be like a text, and along these lines, Danto (1999a) 
speculates “if we are, so to speak, a text made fl esh then a beginning 
might be made in addressing certain problems concerning the identity 
and unity of a person against the model of the unity and identity of a 
text” (220).3
To better understand Danto’s position, it is helpful to examine how 
Danto may have been infl uenced by Nietzsche, who Lydia Goehr (2008) 
holds was his most signifi cant predecessor (84, 152). I contend that 
the infl uence of Hegel in Danto’s work is often overstated, and that of 
Nietzsche or Sartre is as often overlooked. Looking at Danto’s philoso-
phy of art within the context of his non-aesthetic writings shows it is a 
mistake to read him as holding that humans give art agency or personi-
fi cation, that this is something we do and that we are aware that we do 
it. Artists do have skill and certain intangible attributes that are mani-
fest through their style, but what gives the artwork personifi cation, or 
3 For an in-depth discussion of these points see (Snyder 2018: 147–167).
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perhaps even agency, are the sentential structures that give us agency. 
These are fundamentally the same structures. Danto’s interpretation 
of Nietzsche cannot and should not be understood as his own system. 
Nonetheless, Danto tells us that he has “quarried” the works of think-
ers on whom he has written, incorporating their thoughts into his own 
philosophy (Danto 1975: 12; LLP reply to Rush 480),4 and I think this 
holds true here.
One reason that Danto is often miscategorized as a Hegelian, out-
side of his frequent praise of Hegel’s aesthetic theory and his apparent 
adoption of Hegel’s end-of-art theory, is that in his effort to overcome 
the mind/body problem, he shares Hegel’s aim of overcoming transcen-
dent metaphysics, a task Hegel has in common with Kant. Though his 
approach is more ontological than Kant’s epistemological project, Dan-
to strives to ‘eliminate’ Cartesian dualism by reducing, in some man-
ner, the signifi cance of the inner-subjective state that Descartes uses to 
ground his own existence as one separate from the external, material 
world. In the end, Danto recognizes that the dualism cannot be com-
pletely eliminated, and he posits a sort of Spinozistic-materialism in 
response to Descartes, arguing that there are two aspects of material 
existence: there is material that represents and material that does not 
(Danto 1999a: 192, LLP 60–61). He refers to this as “representational 
materialism.”5
I once encountered the argument that one need not know anything 
about the human subject in Danto’s philosophy of art. I could not dis-
agree more. Though Danto clearly eschews the Cartesian notion of in-
ner subject often employed by Continental philosophers, in order to 
support his own answer to the mind/body problem, he replaces the Car-
tesian subject with a ‘thinner’ subject that in my estimation is outside 
the mainstream of philosophical thought.6 The thinner notion of the 
person, that Danto refers to as res or ens representans,7 is, I hope to 
show, the key to understanding Danto’s philosophy at a deeper level.8 
In fact, in my assessment, his philosophy of art cannot be fully under-
4 The following abbreviation is used in this essay: LLP for Auxier, R. E. and 
Lewis E. H. (eds.) 2013. This volume contains essays by multiple authors with 
responses from or an essay by Danto. When cited, if the authorial context is not 
clear, the author’s name will be inserted after the abbreviation. Otherwise, assume 
that the reference is to Danto.
5 Danto was a student of Susan Langer, who was an anti-reductionist materialist. 
Danto’s representational materialism is likely a continuation of Langer’s ontology.
6 Danto’s entry on the “Person” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy might 
foreshadow his position, especially in his suggestion that, “Persons may indeed, 
then, be ontologically primitive as “wavicles” (not waves and not particles, but both 
together) are perhaps physically primitive.” 
7 Danto appears to use these terms interchangeably.
8 Danto’s notion of the person seems to be infl uenced more by Eastern philosophy, 
perhaps drawing on Nietzsche, and according to Randall Auxier, Danto’s early 
interest in Zen.
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stood without understanding his account of the human as a representa-
tional being. In The Body/Body Problem Danto (1999a) writes:
There is a general problem of how our representations are embodied, pre-
sumably in our central nervous system, but I have been struck, in reading 
through the essays that compose this volume, by how frequently I drew 
upon analogies between human beings and artworks, preeminently paint-
ings and photographs, to clarify issues in the metaphysics of embodiment 
and of truth. In the past some years I have written extensively on the con-
cept of art, but what these essays make vivid is the degree to which that 
concept has dominated the way I have thought philosophically about any 
topic, and this has set my writing apart from much of the philosophical 
mainstream. But that can be explained, I think, through the fact that art 
is typically thought to be marginal to philosophy, a kind of ontological frill, 
whereas it is in my view absolutely central to thinking about subjects—es-
pecially subjects having to do with our own philosophical nature, to which 
the pertinence of the concept of art seems initially remote … [These essays] 
project a single, evolving conception of human beings, considered as beings 
who represent as ens representans with works of art simultaneously being 
understood as materially embodied representations. (ix–x)
As does Hegel, Danto holds that art and philosophy are intertwined in 
human experience, and they both strive, in their philosophies, to over-
come the subject-object dualism defi ning the mind/body problem. This, 
given Danto’s claim that art has ended, leads readers to the conclusion 
that there must be a Hegelian reading of Danto. But even if infl uenced 
early on by Hegel, as many have noted, Danto takes a fundamentally 
different position, and his solution to the mind/body problem in many 
ways moves closer to Nietzsche’s thought as a “body/body” problem. 
Danto speculates that the representational subject lives in a “senten-
tial state,” in which “belief is a relationship between a person and a 
sentence” (LLP 32). But humans are not the only material that repre-
sents; hence, examining this connection more closely will yield a better 
understanding of his notion of art’s ‘personifi cation’.
My hope is not so much to urge more philosophers to become aestheticians, 
much less philosophers of history, but to make plain what we sacrifi ce in our 
ultimate self-understanding if we think of art and of history as anything but 
fundamental to how we are made, and how our bodies must therefore be in 
order for this to be true. (Danto 1999a: x)
Danto (1999a) had planned to write a book on ens representans (15), 
but confessed he never had the energy. Still, he sees representations as 
the unifying theme of his fi ve major works9 (LLP 29–30), and pushing 
the implications of his thinner, perhaps Zen-like, notion of the person 
leads to a far richer understanding of his theory of art. It also reveals 
a stream of thought that points to what I see as a radically different 
9 Danto (1999a) writes that he was inspired by Santayana’s fi ve-volume Life of 
Reason to write a system of philosophy in fi ve volumes; Analytical Philosophy of 
History, Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, Analytical Philosophy of Action, The 
Transfi guration of the Commonplace, and The Body/Body Problem, are the results 
of this endeavor (14–15).
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account of humans and their art, and though it goes well beyond the 
scope of this essay, it could open the way to new theological insights. 
1. Style is the man: The body/body problem
In the sections that follow, I briefl y discuss how the basic action may 
have been used as an anti-dualistic tool; Danto’s account of the person 
as representation and text, to understand the relation of the human to 
the artworld10 and how it emerges without the ‘dialogue’ of an institu-
tional theory of art; and his account of inner and outer consciousness 
in representation, communication, and language, which spells out how 
art can transfi gure an audience without the artist’s self-refl ection or a 
dialogue among artist and audience.11
Danto tells us that the basic action, in its early manifestations, was 
an attempt to overcome the mind/body problem. Statements like ‘I am 
my hand, I am my body’ went with the idea that the basic action could 
bridge the gap Descartes opened between the mind and body. Sartre 
(1992) wrote “The point of view of pure knowledge is contradictory; 
there is only the point of view of engaged knowledge. [Thus,] knowledge 
and action are only two abstract aspects of an original, concrete rela-
tion” (407). Sartre’s anti-Cartesian claim was part of a broader move-
ment that led thinkers to believe the body must hold properties com-
mon to the mind that evoked action in it. It was hoped that if the causal 
gap between the mind and the body could be fi lled, perhaps the “cogni-
tive gap” would follow too. The basic action was one of the key threads 
of this search for unity of knowledge and action (Danto 1999a: 66–67): 
“knowledge- and action-ascriptions bridge the space between represen-
tations and objects” (Danto 1973: 22). But the basic action could not 
fulfi ll this promise, and Danto (1999a) lost interest in it, considering it 
a failure (51, 80). The problem, as the locus of the mind/body problem 
shifted, did not go away. “By closing the gap between our minds and 
our bodies, we open a gap between our bodies, on the one side, and 
mere bodies on the other” (64). Danto’s solution was to rearticulate the 
mind/body problem as the body/body problem (LLP Auxier xxvii), not 
necessarily solving the problem, but doing away with philosophical is-
10 The “artworld” is a term Danto coined in 1964: “to see something as art requires 
something the eye cannot de[s]cry—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge 
of the history of art: an artworld” (580). It should not be confused with the common 
usage of the ‘art world’ referring simply to artists, art historians, curators, etcetera 
who are involved with or make a profession in the ‘world of art’. Danto does not 
always use a single word to refer to the “artworld,” but in this essay, when I use a 
single word, it refers to Danto’s conceptual structure; when I use two words, “art 
world,” I refer to the people involved in the arts.
11 The dialogue among artists, curators and audience (the art world) might be 
appropriate to what George Dickie referred to as the institutional theory of art. 
Nonetheless, Danto considered the institutional theory of art incapable of providing 
a rule that differentiates visible from non-visible attributes of art.
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sues bound to dual substances. This returns us to Danto’s account of 
representational realism:
there are two kinds of matter in the universe, matter that is representa-
tional and matter that is not. It endorses a metaphysics that holds the world 
to be such that parts of it rise to represent itself, including, of course, the 
further fact that those parts not only represent the world but represent 
that they do so. Representational beings—ourselves and animals—are like 
openings in the darkness, like lights going on, illuminating the world and 
themselves at once. (1989: 244)
Danto’s approach, as I understand it, is unique. Danto always main-
tained that he remained within the fold of analytical philosophy. 
Working broadly within the analytical framework of the philosophy of 
language, he recognized, with Nietzsche, that it is an illusion that lan-
guage corresponds directly to the world.
I saw [Nietzsche’s] work as anticipating Russell and Wittgenstein…Most 
of what appealed to me in Nietzsche was his essential insight that philoso-
phers had tended to think that if language is to fi t the world, it had to do so 
like a tight garment, matching the articulation of the human body. To every 
subject in a sentence, there must be a substance in the world to which it cor-
responds as if, he says in more [than] one place, the lightning is something 
separate from the fl ashing. This is grammatical superstition. (LLP reply to 
Andina 512)
Though Danto did not agree with Nietzsche that there is no world to 
which language could correspond, his choice of representation as the 
basic orientation of his philosophy refl ected the recognition of this 
“grammatical superstition.” In broad strokes, the argument Danto lays 
out in Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge for the representation hav-
ing an advantage over descriptively oriented linguistic philosophy goes 
something like this. An example of a representation is ‘x believes p’. A 
truth value cannot be ascribed to this if one does not know whether or 
not p corresponds to some state in the world. Danto circumvents the 
problem of knowing whether p is true or not by viewing the state of 
belief as itself true, the representation is true, insofar as ‘x believes p 
is true’, independent of p corresponding to anything in the world. Thus, 
the belief, as a representation, is intensional. Its truth as a belief does 
not rely on there being any extensional objects, or objects in the world 
that refer to it. For Danto, our entire world, as we understand it, is a 
representation, and its correspondence to something in the world is not 
guaranteed; because we believe our representation of the world, our 
world, to be true, we never question it. It still holds, nonetheless, that 
our survival chances are increased as our representation of the world 
approaches the ‘actual’ world.
The representation is not descriptive. Danto chose the representa-
tion as the focus of his philosophical system because it was prior to 
description, description being too closely tied to an inclination for truth 
(Danto 1968; LLP 29–30). The truth itself was not so much of a problem, 
but philosophical systems that strive for a strong correspondence the-
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ory of truth often become trapped in their infl exibility. Danto’s choice 
allows for a more pliable antifoundationalist approach better suited to 
creating defi nitions, which in many cases are prior to truth statements. 
Without determining which parts of language refer to which parts of 
the world, we can have no truth. Representations need not be true, in-
sofar as they correspond to something in the world. This works well for 
art. But this does not mean representations are against truth; histori-
cal narratives are representations, which, unlike art, strive to convince 
us of their veracity (LLP Ankersmit 395–397, 415).
The sentential state is one in which someone believes something. 
Representations are sentential states of sorts; hence, if we are repre-
sentational beings, we are also sentential beings (Danto 1999a: 27, 87–
88; Danto 1968: ix, 86–97). Danto, recognizing that there is no knowl-
edge outside of our frame of reference, inserts the subject, a sentential 
being, into the frame of his philosophical system. He must draw a line, 
though, between material that represents and material that does not 
represent—humans and animals being those that do.12 “As far as the 
mind-body problem goes, the view I am advancing is that the body is 
itself sententially structured. Perhaps, even probably, what is senten-
tially structured is nervous tissue, which is perhaps all that neurophi-
losophy requires to vindicate its chief insight” (Danto 1989: 243). He 
also makes clear that the sentential structure, which forms the rep-
resentations that are our “essence” (Danto 1999a: 203), is not found 
simply in fl esh. “It is the same proposition whether written or spoken 
or believed, whether it is made up of sound waves, layers of ink, or ner-
vous tissue” (Danto 1989: 243; see Danto 1968: 95). Representations, 
as Danto refers to them, encompass a broad array of communicative 
devices. “Propositions, pictures, names, signs, ideas, appearances—for 
to be an appearance is to be an appearance of something, leaving it 
always open if the thing itself really appears or not—not to mention 
impressions, concepts, and images, are all vehicles of understanding as 
I mean for that expression to be used” (Danto 1989: 50–51; see Danto 
1968: 160–161). Danto considers these vehicles to be representations 
and the “central components of philosophical thought,” irrespective of 
where they are “housed” (Danto 1989: 51). So, the line between ens 
representans and things that represent is blurred at this point, since he 
sees no fundamental difference in regard to a representation’s content 
and how it is embodied (Danto 1999a: 91–92). Still, not all representa-
tions are as we are. A gas gauge represents some truth about the world 
if functioning properly, but “the representation must modify the ens 
representans in some way other than that which consists simply in hav-
ing the representation” (Danto 1989: 251).
12 Danto mentions with some frequency the idea that animals, like us, 
are representing beings. In other texts, he makes frequent references to the 
representational capacities of dogs. That said, humans are creatures that live in 
history, and animals do not (Danto 1989: 273).
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According to Danto’s account of representational materialism, the 
human body exists in two aspects: the basic biological mechanism and 
the part that lives in history and represents. “We are within the world 
under the laws of causation and outside the world under the laws of 
representation” (1999a: 93). The human that is the body is the human 
that is the person (I am my body), but the one cannot be reduced to the 
other. As sentential beings, we are, to use a metaphor he often employs, 
words made fl esh (143, 222). One consequence of the move away from 
Cartesian mind/body dualism—which posited an inner subjectivity 
such that the thinking subject had a special advantage when it came 
to knowing her own interiority—is that in its material orientation, the 
inner realm of ens representans loses much, if not all, of its signifi cance. 
It is not so much that there is no interior; rather, we manifest our inte-
riority externally because we are not aware of it as such. Because ens 
representans has no privileged access to its own inner states, more can 
be discerned from the outer perspective, for “we do not occupy our own 
interiors” (Danto 2007: 339).
This leveling of inner and outer plays a role in Danto’s theory (1) 
in that if one were to gain access to another’s interior, one would gain 
little and (2) given (1) when the historian forms a narrative statement13 
referring to a past era, ‘understanding’ other minds from an external 
perspective is not a problem. (1) Regarding the dualism of mind and 
body, Danto speculates that if we could actually monitor the neuro-
chemical activity of our brains as we laugh, tell secrets, or philosophize, 
we would get little from this that we didn’t get otherwise (Danto 1999a: 
28). More than once, he discusses an example used by Leibniz, who 
asks, what if we created a machine that could “think, feel and have 
perception.” If the machine were large enough, we could step into it, 
witnessing thought, feeling, and perception as it happens. But, he sup-
poses, it would likely just resemble the inner workings of a mill. Would 
this tell us more about the inner human side of what it is to think, 
feel, and perceive? We may learn more about how the mind functions, 
but little more about what it actually is to feel. If we could enter into 
another person, as Leibniz’s mill, Danto doesn’t really think we’d get 
much more than we would from talking to people, knowing them, read-
ing their letters, or even perhaps following them on Facebook or Twit-
ter (Danto 1989: 255–256; Danto 2013: 93–94).
13 According to Danto, when narrative-historical models are employed, the 
narrative structure is useful only when looking back in time. Thus, any attempt to 
project on the future a historical model that assumes a specifi c account of history 
as a whole is not prediction but “prophecy” (Danto 2007: 9). Danto’s narrative 
philosophy of history focuses on what he calls narrative sentences. Danto uses the 
following example to explain the narrative sentence. In 1618, it could not have been 
stated that ‘The Thirty Years’ War has begun today.’ Only from the perspective of 
future historians, after the war’s completion in 1648, could one make reference to 
The Thirty Years’ War (Danto 2007: 152).
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(2) In terms of other minds, and other minds of other times, the issue 
is somewhat more complex since it involves presuppositions concern-
ing the structure of narrative sentences. Because our representation 
manifests how we understand and causally interact with the world, 
we live in it unaware. We can be aware of another’s representation of 
the world, especially if it differs from our own, but of our own, we can-
not know it as we use it. We would have to become a new self, perhaps 
looking back at the self of another time, to apprehend it. So the outer 
perspective, again, is in some way superior to the inner. Danto wrote, 
in response to Lydia Goehr, that he did not rely as much as she thought 
on the artistic intention, though it is indeed important. He conceded 
that artistic intention was important for Kunstwissenschaft insofar as 
establishing the general aim of the artist is important because, though 
there is no limit to how many interpretations there can be for an art-
work, not all interpretations are possible. Regarding narrative sentenc-
es, Danto’s answer was couched in terms of the way he prioritizes the 
inner and the outer. Intention,
has little bearing in the philosophy of history when the apparatus of narra-
tive sentences is introduced—Petrarch could not have intended to open the 
Renaissance, Erasmus did not aim to be the best pre-Kantian moral theorist 
in all of Europe. But neither does it arise in the interpretive redescriptions 
we give of artworks when we talk about them hermeneutically. (LLP 388)
The signifi cance of an action, whether an artistic creation or one that 
causes an event, and what there is to ‘know’ about it, will not be known 
until later; thus, the immediate intention may not be congruent with 
its signifi cance. The contours of an individual’s world cannot be known 
to that individual, but only to those who observe the person. In terms 
of historical context, an individual’s world is only graspable by a histo-
rian when that world is no longer lived.
It is important to understand what bearing a materialist ens rep-
resentans with fl attened inner and outer realms (at a minimum an in-
ner realm of lessened signifi cance) has on Danto’s account of embodied 
meaning, especially in terms of how the artwork comes to be manifest 
with artistic intention. There are several important issues that I hope 
to clarify here: (1) to provide a fuller explanation for how embodied 
meaning, what in Hegelian terms is a universal particular, is possible; 
(2) how Danto’s frequent reference to the personhood of art can make 
sense within his system; and (3) given (1–3), I would like to make sense 
of Danto’s suggestion that artworks are in a dialogue with each other.
Works of art, as ens representans, are “materially embodied repre-
sentations” (Danto 1999a: x). By choosing the medium of representa-
tion as the basis of his philosophical system, Danto saw a pre-descrip-
tive way to handle epistemological issues in a more fl exible manner. It 
also better refl ects how we live in the world. Because one of the richest 
repositories of representations is found in the realm of art, Danto takes 
a special interest in it. To my surprise, the reasoning behind Danto’s 
assertion that art and philosophy are interconnected is not due to art’s 
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expressive qualities or some unique property art has in manifesting the 
human condition. Rather, it is because we share properties with rep-
resentations, insofar as we occupy the same space between language 
and the world (Danto 1968: ix, 63). Frank Ankersmit contends that for 
Danto, “aesthetics is not merely an interesting offshoot of philosophy 
in general, to be addressed after a few more fundamental philosophi-
cal issues have been settled; on the contrary, aesthetics, because of 
its preoccupation with representation, is where all meaningful philoso-
phy originates” (LLP 395). As a creature bound to representations, ens 
representans shares a common philosophical origin with works of art, 
which points to a common form of embodiment. Danto has made much 
of his somewhat tenuous belief that the mind is like a text, that it can 
be read as a text and that we are texts embodied (Danto 1989: 248, 
267; Danto 1999a: 144, 204, 222). “Why should we not suppose that 
some day sentences might serve to individuate neural states, so that 
we might read a man’s beliefs off the surfaces of his brain?” (Danto 
1968: 96). A sentence ‘x believes p’ can exist in print, on ink and paper, 
be spoken or inscribed on our being. The content or meaning is funda-
mentally the same. A belief may be that ‘x is p’, when in fact ‘x is not p’. 
Like a picture, it need not be true, and at the pre-linguistic level, one 
can have such a state. Even a dog can have a belief, which is intension-
al, thereby being in a sentential state, perhaps believing it is taking a 
ride to the park, when in fact the veterinarian is the destination. The 
medium of “vehicles of understanding,” representations, or sentential 
states are broad. The chart below is an attempt to show the relation 
of representing and non-representing to organic and inorganic things.
  Table 4.1 Type and capacity of objects 
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What should be noted is that not all things that represent, or that are 
sentential, are organic. Pictures, texts, some machines, to mention a 
few, are inorganic.14 As Danto stated, what he wrote in The Body/Body 
Problem was never fully integrated into a systematic text, but the refer-
ences to the word enfl eshed and the mind as a text are found through-
out his works. Thus, I believe the answer to the question of embodied 
meaning is found in the properties shared among living and non-living 
material that represents. There are at least some attributes of the rep-
resentations making us human—that are part of our essence—which 
can exist in non-organic mediums: art, as the embodiment of matter 
and form, is one of those mediums.
The representation is intensional, a state of belief about something 
that may or may not exist. It is what manifests our human meanings: 
our representations are our world inscribed upon us, and the represen-
tation that we more or less inherit from our place and time in history 
determines to a large extent the choices we will make, a point of view 
being something that “representational causes” take into consideration 
(Danto 1989: 272–273; Danto 1973: 188–189). The signifi cance of Dan-
to’s shift away from subjective interiority becomes clearer here. If the 
representations that make us ‘who we are’ are external, then they can 
be externalized in other mediums, such as art.
The mind, construed as embodied—as enfl eshed—might perhaps stand to 
the body as a statue does to the bronze that is its material cause, or as a pic-
ture stands to the pigment it gives form to—or as signifi ed stands to signi-
fi er, in the idiom of Saussure. And to the degree that “inside” and “outside” 
have application at all, it is the mind that is outside, in the sense that it is 
what is presented to the world. (Danto1999a: 197)
Though Danto suggests that the metaphors we use to describe the con-
nection of mind and body are not always helpful, we can perhaps un-
derstand here how the mind that is presented to others is embodied in 
the artwork, making it, as us, a representational ‘being’, much like the 
woodblock leaves the imprint on the paper.
Danto (1992) wrote that one task of philosophy is “to draw the 
boundary lines which divide the universe into the most fundamental 
kinds of things that exist. There may of course be no differences so fun-
damental as all that, in which case a task still remains for philosophy: 
namely, to show how lines believed to divide the universe in funda-
mental ways can be erased” (6). As Danto sought to erase and redraw 
the boundary between mind and body, inner and outer consciousness, 
I see in his writing moves toward redrawing the boundaries of agency. 
Before proceeding, I should try to better defi ne what I mean by agency 
in this context. Certainly, Danto ascribes to humans a metaphysical 
14 It is not unequivocally clear that the set of representational beings is congruent 
with the set of sentential beings, but I think they are close enough to conclude that 
what he writes about sentential beings applies to ens representans. Tiziana Andina 
(2011) discusses “representations that human beings incorporate in a physical 
structure different from their body” (54–55, see 46–55). 
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agency, or freedom, that is not present in inorganic objects. But when 
he refers to representational causality, he implies that above our meta-
physical freedom, we are directed by forces, sententially embodied, of 
which we are unaware. Of course, these inorganic structures have no 
activity in and of themselves, but if we step into them or, in the case of 
our own worlds, are born into them, knowingly or not, we activate their 
agency insofar as our choices are constrained to the possibilities inher-
ent within the representation’s narrative, if it has a narrative form. 
“Representations, in the form of intentions and reasons, themselves 
cause action” (Danto 1973: 189–190). By agency, I mean no more than 
this, but it is nonetheless signifi cant for my reading of Danto.
Returning to Nietzsche, let us examine the following passage in 
which Danto explains how, for Nietzsche, inner and outer conscious-
ness are not really different.
In part he was endeavoring to break the grip of a prejudice we are almost 
unaware that we are dominated by; namely, that we know what we are 
better than we know anything in the world. Each of us is convinced that 
however others may be mistaken about our feelings and sincerity, we our-
selves cannot be in error, and that we exercise, in at least this one domain, 
an unimpeachable authority. This prejudice is underwritten by the common 
philosophical teaching that we have immediate access to the workings of 
our own minds. (Danto 2005: 98)
Nietzsche proposes that we do not have privileged access to our own 
minds. In 1965, Danto (2005) writes that Nietzsche presents “a re-
markable and, to my knowledge, utterly original theory of conscious-
ness” (98). It is safe to say that Danto incorporated this idea into what 
was to become his own theory of consciousness, which refl ects the par-
allel stance on other minds that he developed in Analytical Philosophy 
of History, written at the same time.15 Nietzsche’s analysis of inner and 
outer consciousness, laid out in The Gay Science §354, posits that there 
is nothing in the inner consciousness that is unique to us because our 
inwardness is still constructed by a language used for external commu-
nication. Danto’s fl attening of the difference between inner and outer 
consciousness is not far from this, even extending to the dream world 
(1999a: 142–143; WA 46–49). There is another, less explicit, thread of 
Danto’s thought that I believe can be attributed to him via Nietzsche, 
which is his account of agency. Nietzsche, especially in his later writ-
ings, sees the idea of the self as a fi ction. It is not so much that there 
is no persistent locus of our experience. Rather, it is the idea that hu-
mans do not possess anything like the transcendental self or a soul, 
something which in itself structures our being. Our self, and to some 
extent our agency, if not issuing from some a priori internal structure, 
comes from the formative power of language, implying that language is 
itself a form of thought (Nietzsche 1968: III §5; Danto 2005: 88). This 
15 The chapters in Narration and Knowledge where other minds are discussed 
explicitly were written in 1966 and 1967, but the concept is present in the original 
publication of Analytical Philosophy of History.
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somewhat Averroean account of thought and language implies that 
there is an agency attributing process that does not correspond to an 
individual entity. I cannot say that Danto explicitly holds this view. 
Danto attributed this idea to Nietzsche, but a number of passages in 
Danto’s published texts indicate it may be part of his own thought. 
Irrespective of whether the idea came from Nietzsche, I don’t see how 
Danto’s philosophical system can come together without holding a view 
something like this. Consider the following passage in which he recalls 
an experience with a friend who is so adamant regarding the truth of 
her perspective that Danto realizes she is in fact defi ned by her per-
spective, in this case, that the aesthetic is essential to art. This pushes 
Danto (1999a) to consider the point of view as an ontological category:
perspectivism in Nietzsche’s metaphysics requires points of view as cen-
ters of power, each seeking to impose itself on blank passive reality. But in 
general, I think, points of view are crucial in the explanation of behavior, 
especially when understood as action, and indeed I am not sure what behav-
ior could be considered as an action that did not refer back to the horizon 
within which the decision of what to do arose for the agent, and with it the 
issues of relevance. (176 –177)
In his assessment of Nietzsche, Danto (2005) attributes this extra-indi-
vidual agency to the will-to-power (88–91). But Danto writes elsewhere 
that the perspective of one’s world does more to defi ne our actions than 
the internal ‘power’ of what one might call our ‘will’. We may be in 
some sense metaphysically free, but our actions are caused through 
representations. “There is, to begin with, the epistemic fact that in or-
der to explain human conduct, we have to take into consideration the 
way humans represent the world, themselves included, so that what 
we are is very often inseparable from what we believe we are” (Danto 
1989: 272). As with his friend, the critic, our perspectives of our world 
inscribe on us our possible causal reactions. Along these lines, Danto 
defi nes four sets of different causal relations, which I do not discuss 
here, that differentiate representational causality from the causality 
we associate with the objective sciences. Our actions, then, are for the 
most part ‘determined’ by our representations. Thus, our agency is in-
scribed upon us through the representation of the world we inherit, 
placing us within a specifi c geographical and historical slot. 
To understand a person’s conduct is accordingly to identify the representa-
tions that explain the conduct, and then to interpret this against the dense 
background of beliefs that compose his picture of the world. Explanation 
in the case of human behavior may be—in fact I believe it is—just causal 
explanation. But the identifi cation of the causes requires some separate op-
eration, call it understanding if you will, which consists more or less in 
identifying the point of view of the agent in question. A point of view is 
something that causes [in the objective sense], other than representational 
causes, cannot be said to have. (Danto 1989: 272)
Danto (1999a) tells us that his plan to write a book on ens representans 
never came to fruition and that what was packed in the essays of The 
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Body/Body Problem would have to suffi ce, though he assured readers 
that all the essential logic was there (15). My conclusions may be an 
extrapolation of what Danto has left for us, but I hold that this posi-
tion, which may have emerged as he wrote on Nietzsche, is present 
throughout his work.
This brings us back to Soucek’s claims about personifi cation and 
art. If our identity, and perhaps even agency, is attributed to us via the 
representations that are essential to who we are, and the representa-
tions are inscribed on us in a way that could be inscribed on another 
medium, then it is possible to understand how, in Danto’s system, art-
works and humans share certain properties. It is not that we lend to, 
implant with, or create in them personifi cation. That would require a 
subjective power, and likely a level of self-refl ection, that Danto does 
not account for. But what he does account for is how representations of 
world and representations in art have a way of guiding us, perhaps in 
a predictive or ‘conversational’ sense that amounts to agency, if even 
in a weak sense. The historically indexed representations, which leave 
an indelible stamp on the identities of artists, form a set of ‘tools’ that 
artists then use to create their artworks. Through the process of inter-
pretation, artworks—imprinted with the world of the artist “by tran-
sitivity of identity” (Danto 1981: 204)—bestow on the interpreter at 
least some of the agency mediating structures, points of view, that rep-
resentations of the world had originally implanted in the artist. This 
explains how, when the beholder steps into the artwork, she is trans-
formed into something “amazing” (173).
If personhood in art is understood as something initiated not so 
much by the ‘self’ as by the same representational structures that also 
form the self, taking this view of ‘agency’ into account will provide an 
explanation for several other facets of Danto’s philosophy that remain 
otherwise unexplained.16 The fi rst, as noted above, is that Danto seems 
to give the artworld a point of view, perhaps even an internal perspec-
tive. In “Moving Pictures” Danto (1999b) discusses fi lm having become 
self-aware. 
Film becomes in a way its own subject, the consciousness that it is fi lm is 
what the consciousness is of, and in this move to self-consciousness cinema 
marches together with the other arts of the twentieth century in the respect 
that art itself becomes the ultimate subject of art, a movement of thought 
which parallels philosophy in the respect that philosophy in the end is what 
philosophy is about. (230)
When Danto declares that the narrative of art has ended, the reason 
given is that art has become self-refl ective. Certainly, without a no-
tion of agency, this is not possible. If one assumes that it is the artists 
who have been self-refl ective on the nature of art, a possibility it seems 
natural to entertain, we could encounter diffi culty with Danto’s claim 
16 For a discussion Danto’s notion of personhood in art as it relates to rhetoric, 
see (Snyder 2018, 182–186).
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that artists cannot self-refl ect on their world. I do not want to enter 
that discussion here. I have done that elsewhere (Snyder 2015), and I 
think it would be more fruitful to pursue the route opened through rep-
resentational materialism. As living beings, “we are attached [to the 
world] by our sensory apparatus. The representation must modify the 
ens representans in some way other than that which consists simply in 
having the representation” (Danto 1989: 251). So to have the property 
of agency that ens representans has, there must be some self-refl ective 
capacity. When Danto discusses art, it clearly has this property, and in 
some references art seems to act independently. The best I can do to in-
terpret this is to reiterate one of the basic tenets of Danto’s essentialist 
defi nition of art: “it is analytical to the concept of an artwork that there 
has to be an interpretation” (Danto 1981: 124). If to be art, art is inter-
preted, then there must be a biological interpreter who ‘activates’ the 
work’s agency. Is self-refl ection in art something that occurs through 
interpretation? Perhaps not in the beholders themselves, but as artists 
‘engage’ with the artworld, they create other works.17 This would allow 
for the type of dialogue he sees happening among artworks:
Warhol’s Brillo Box was enfranchised as a work of art when the boxes it 
exactly resembled languished in the limbo of mere objects, though they re-
sembled his boxes exactly. ... The relationship between Brillo Box and the 
other members of “the world of art works” was more complex. They were “in 
dialogue” with one another, as curators like to say. (LLP reply to Ankersmit 
429)
What would such a dialogue entail? If the artwork represents the style 
of the time, and the style of the time endows a person with a somewhat 
narrowly defi ned agency, an agency that makes an individual predict-
able without being determined, then the artworks could conceivably 
be in dialogue. In a response to Noël Carroll, Danto argued that the 
history of art had a “historical implicature” and that the creation of 
artworks, throughout the era of art, had obeyed a certain logic of con-
versations, insofar as what comes next in a conversation is something 
that makes sense in terms of what came before it. Though his point 
was to show that when this conversational structure had been “broken” 
there would be no more art of this style, he clearly states that there is 
a conversational structure in non-biological representations such that 
a dialogue can take place among them (LLP 456–457, 52).18
17 In “Outsider Art,” Danto (2001) conceded that outsider art might not be art in 
the sense he means here, since outsider artists do not engage the artworld; they are 
an artworld unto themselves. Though outsider artists may have talent, they are not 
part of the conversation of the artworld, and, for critics, their works are impossible 
to explain (242–249).
18 In The Body/Body Problem, Danto (1999a) speculates that there are interactive 
processes that are mediated as sentential states, implying a kind of inter-system 
information processing that could be common to certain machines and biological 
entities. “The laws of behavior for sententially characterized beings—animals, some 
machines, and us—must take account of the truth-relations between the world and 
us, as well as within us, as part of their own truth-conditions” (90–92).
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The representative structure of the artwork mirrors the structure 
of the person, and in some way the artwork can enter into a conversa-
tion that anticipates a certain kind of action. Goehr’s (2008) essay on 
the musicality of violence recognizes the common organizational fea-
tures of the artwork and acts of violence, each being born of histori-
cal representations. “The terrorist act and the artwork share certain 
structural or internal logical features because they draw on a common 
history of aesthetic, political, and religious assumption” (171). In her 
essay, she points out that even against the best of intentions a musi-
cal composition aiming at commemoration can bring back the terror, 
precisely because the shared structures the artwork uses are evoked 
in performance.
Though the artwork can anticipate, as in a conversation, its ability 
to infl uence the action of a beholder outside of the artistic conversation 
should not be overstated. It may have little or no effect. But the rep-
resentations of our world, which plot the fi eld of likely human actions, 
also play a guiding role in the way artists create art insofar as artists 
are carrying on the conversation through their art. And the conversa-
tion is carried on as long as art is following a particular style, a conver-
sation that is predictable without being determined.
Often citing Buffon, Danto asserts that “style is the man.” Style, for 
Danto (1981), is something immediate, like a basic action or concept; it 
refers directly to whatever it is that makes something style (200). If the 
content is removed from the representation, style is all that remains. 
Nonetheless, in the creation of the artwork, style and substance issue 
from the same impulse (197). Style, for Danto, encompasses the ability 
to apprehend directly what others see indirectly. Those not possessing 
their own style must imitate others. Imitators can acquire a manner by 
learning, but only by imitating those with style. Thus, when one has 
learned the manner of style, one ‘knows’ in a mediated fashion, whereas 
the one who manifests style, grasps it in an unmediated way (200–201). 
Danto defi nes style as the unconscious self-representation of the way 
in which the world at a particular place and time is imprinted on the 
artist (206–207, 214–215). Imperceptible to artists, this representation 
is nonetheless perceptible to the audience. This notion of style links the 
artist’s work to its historical context, making it interpretable to pres-
ent and future audiences.19 When one paints in the style of Rembrandt, 
19 To illustrate this, Danto uses the example of the forger Han van Meegeren. 
Van Meegeren wanted confi rmation from his contemporaries, even if his success 
meant it could not be acknowledged, that his paintings were as good as those of 
Vermeer, so he painted Christ at Emmaus, which was for some time accepted as 
a work of Vermeer’s. The evidence that eventually revealed its fraudulent identity 
was not the modern x-ray, but rather the manner used in painting. Van Meegeren’s 
brush strokes bore the manner of the 1930s, which could not have been used in 
the manner of a mid seventeenth-century painting by Vermeer (Danto 1981: 41–
3). Van Meegeren is perhaps known as the most notorious forger in art history. 
His forgeries, made in the 1930s, were accepted by one of the most renowned art 
historians of the day, Abraham Bredius, who declared van Meegeren’s Christ at 
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one can master the technique, the manner, but it is somehow separated 
from the style, because the style is bound to the person whose style it is. 
So when someone paints in the style of Rembrandt, he has adopted a man-
ner, and to at least that degree he is not immanent in the painting in the 
way Rembrandt is. The language of immanence is made licit by the identity 
of the man himself and his style—he is his style—and by transitivity of 
identity Rembrandt is his paintings considered in the perspective of style. 
(204)
Toward the end of The Transfi guration of the Commonplace, Danto 
presents in a few pages a summation of the interconnections among 
the various parts of his philosophy, and how they tie his theory of art 
together (204–208). Danto asks, “What, really, is ‘the man himself’?” 
His answer is found in the way that we embody our representations: “I 
have argued a theory to the effect that we are systems of representa-
tions, ways of seeing the world, representations incarnate” (204).
If, according to Danto, style is the person and the person is trans-
ferred to the work through “transitivity of identity,” then we can con-
clude that Danto did not hold that we personify art through a conscious 
action. It seems more accurate to say that we are personifi ed in our art. 
Given what Danto has articulated in the passages cited in this essay, 
if we are the incarnation of the representations of our ways of seeing 
the world, then this would also hold true of the artworks that we cre-
ate. Soucek’s suggestions, that we look at who we are such that we 
personify art, is in some sense true, but a more accurate formulation 
would be this: whatever representations we personify are, by transi-
tivity, also personifi ed in our art. This ‘personifi cation’ does not come 
about through artistic ‘intention’; rather, it is transferred through the 
artist’s style that is the artist’s original choice and the representation 
of her world.20 Understanding Danto’s account of our own personhood, 
Emmaus to be a stunning fi nd and, perhaps, the greatest Vermeer ever. Part of the 
reason these forgeries were not detected at the time, was due to the failure of the 
current artworld to recognize its own mannerisms. However, van Meegeren himself 
revealed his forgeries after the Second World War to avoid the charge of treason. 
Van Meegeren was accused of collaborating with the Nazis by aiding the enemy 
to acquire Dutch national treasures. His name was connected with the sale of The 
Woman Taken in Adultery, allegedly painted by Vermeer, to Nazi Field Marshal 
Goering, and for this he was imprisoned. The charge of treason resulted in the death 
penalty, so van Meegeren revealed his secret. To his defense, he claimed to be a 
national hero, having traded Goering two hundred original Dutch paintings for his 
forgery, thus saving them from Nazi confi scation. After a two-year trial, in which 
van Meegeren was compelled to demonstrate his forging technique, the charge was 
reduced to forgery, and he was sentenced to one year in prison. Van Meegeren died 
in prison before his term was served.
20 Regarding Sartre’s notions of freedom and original choice, Danto (1975) writes 
that our choice is our character, insofar as it determines who we are in life; it is our 
being. “Our basic freedom, then, lies less in our power to choose than to choose, in the 
respect that the primal and original choice determines a style of choosing, and the 
style is the man himself” (137). For a discussion of the infl uence of Sartre on Danto’s 
notion of style see (Snyder 2018: 187–192).
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as the incarnation of our world representation, also clarifi es Danto’s 
notion of embodied meaning, giving a clearer idea of how representa-
tions are endowed with the meanings and manners of a given time. For 
Danto, the points of view that we are born into and the attitude or style 
that we to some small extent adopt are who we are. This “ontological 
category,” which perhaps, in the sense discussed above, has a kind of 
agency of its own, is what is transferred to and interpreted in art; thus, 
some of the properties of personhood that are common to us are also 
found in art.
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